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Sammendrag 
Den store industrimagnaten Andrew Carnegie (1835-1919) mente at barn ikke hadde godt av å arve 
formue fordi det ville undergrave deres vilje til å arbeide.  I denne studien undersøker vi om den 
såkalte Carnegie-effekten, altså at arv fører til redusert arbeidsinnsats, er av stor betydning i Norge. 
Videre undersøker vi om det er en midlertidig eller en varig effekt, og hvordan responsen varierer 
mellom husholdningstyper. Vi finner en signifikant reduksjon i arbeidsinntekten til personer som arver 
mer enn en gjennomsnittlig stor arv, på om lag 7 til 10 prosent. Effekten er størst i de første to til tre 
årene etter arven, men også så lenge som seks år etter er det en signifikant negativ effekt. Unge 
arvemottakere og mottakere nær pensjonsalder reduserer arbeidstilbudet mest, og enslige mer enn gifte 
med små barn. Vi har en hypotese om at arvinger som selv har livsarvinger har en lavere tilbøyelighet 
til å bruke arven på seg selv enn arvinger uten egne livsarvinger, altså at man føler et ansvar for å 
videreføre ressursene til neste generasjon. Derfor ser vi spesielt på om arvemottakere uten egne 
livsarvinger er mer tilbøyelige til å bruke arven på seg selv, i form av mer fritid og mindre arbeid. Vi 
finner at dette stemmer. Å skattlegge arven reduserer Carnegie-effekten, og øker dermed 
arbeidstilbudet. Resultatene har også implikasjoner for hvordan arveavgiftssystemet bør utformes. 
Både progressive satser og lavere sats for livsarvinger støttes av våre resultater. 
1 Introduction
The potential of harmful effects of intergenerational transfers on donees was elo-
quently expressed by the 19th century industrialist Andrew Carnegie: “the parent
who leaves his son enormous wealth generally deadens the talents and energies of
the son, and tempts him to live a less useful and less worthy life than he otherwise
would ...” (Carnegie, 1962).1 Hence, even though bequests in many societies in
the 21st century are more often received by offspring in their fifties rather than by
young adults, and few bequests have the size of the wealth of Andrew Carnegie,
detrimental effects of inheritance on donees’ labor supply are often referred to as
the “Carnegie conjecture” or the “Carnegie effect”, see Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993).
Recently there has been a resurgence in the interest of taxation of wealth
transfers, with several studies suggesting that taxation of intergenerational transfers
is preferable, see for example Golosov et al. (2003), Piketty and Saez (2013) Piketty
(2013) and Kopczuk (2013).2 The Carnegie effect possesses an important role in
the discussion of tax design, see for example Kopczuk (2013), who refers to it as a
fiscal externality cost due to loss of tax revenue. Knowledge about the heterogeneity
of the response is important in this perspective. For example, the variation in
supply responses with respect to the size of the transfer may be accounted for in
the design of a possible inheritance tax schedule, i.e., in terms of progressivity in
tax rates. Further, how the Carnegie effect works with respect to age and early
retirement schemes is relevant for policy. The large oil windfall in Norway, which
may both increase demand for labor and reduce labor supply (Van der Ploeg, 2011),
combined with demographical challenges, makes it vital to uphold the labor market
participation. If bequests are extensively used to shorten working careers, one may
decide to tax the transfer, and the heterogeneity of the Carnegie affect may provide
guidance on how this can be done.In any discussion of the economic implications of
the Carnegie effect it is thus useful to obtain information on who the respondents
are (are they e.g., in their prime working age or closer to retirement?), how much
they respond, and the time frame of the responses (i.e., the persistence of effects).
The Carnegie effect represents an idiosyncratic income effect, which cannot
simply be represented by other income effect estimates, as those obtained from
the labor supply literature. In this perspective it is surprising that relatively few
1Carnegie gave or bequeathed most of his vast fortune to charity.
2However, tax rates have been cut in several OECD countries, such as the US, the UK, Italy,
and France (Piketty, 2010), and some countries, such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden,
Austria and Norway, have abolished their bequest tax completely. Still, the dominant picture, see
Denk (2012) and Strawczynski (2014), is that inheritance tax schedules are widespread in OECD
countries.
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Carnegie estimates are found in the literature; exceptions are Holtz-Eakin et al.
(1993), Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994), Joulfaian (2006), Brown et al. (2010) and
Elinder et al. (2012). The lack of empirical evidence is explained by severe obstacles
in the identification of effects. A major problem is that if the inheritance is expected,
the transfer will be fully absorbed in the life cycle plan of the recipient according to
the standard life cycle model. A perfectly foreseen inheritance would lower the heir’s
marginal utility of wealth from the first year of his economic life, yielding a downward
shift in his entire life cycle profile of labor. Permanent life cycle adjustments are
obviously not easily identified in data. Still, we expect to observe short term Carnegie
effects, as at least some recipients will time their labor supply responses to the
period just after the actual transfer: some inheritances are unexpected, beneficiaries
may be liquidity constrained (before the actual transfer), and risk averse recipients
will avoid using money they do not have.
This study contributes to the knowledge about short term Carnegie effects
by exploiting exceptional Norwegian register-based administrative data. Even
though the Carnegie effect may be measured with error, biased downward due
to measurement problems because of anticipated bequests, we identify responses
materializing in the time period shortly after the transfer. Further, we add to the
understanding of Carnegie effects by discussing empirical evidence across population
groups. As we have access to a large panel data set for the years 1997 to 2010,
covering the whole population, we can enter into a relatively broad and detailed
discussion of Carnegie effects. The previous literature on Carnegie effects, such as
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993), Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994), and Brown et al. (2010),
have had limited scope for more detailed analysis, as they predominantly have been
based on evidence from sample surveys, with restricted sample sizes.
The Carnegie effect is measured by addressing information on three labor supply
response indicators: inheritor’s wage income, working hours and early retirement
take-up. Identification is based on comparing inheritors to non-recipients with
similar characteristics, using propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983). To avoid possible short term anticipatory effects, the matching is done three
years before receipt of inheritances. Moreover, to see how effects evolve over time,
we measure responses 1−6 years after receiving bequests. As a control we use the
same specification to describe inheritor’s behavior 1−6 years prior to transfers, when
no behavioral differences between recipients and non-recipients are expected.
Response heterogeneity is measured along several dimensions, based on both
characteristics of the heirs and attributes of the setting in which they make their
decisions. Firstly, we examine the age dependency of the Carnegie effect, highlighting
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that many recipients are in their fifties or sixties. The interaction with public transfer
schedules, such as the early retirement scheme, is important in this perspective.
Secondly, given that there are (fixed) costs of finding a new optimum, as is well-
established in the labor market literature (see, for instance, Cogan, 1981, Altonji
and Paxson, 1992, and Chetty, 2012), we expect to observe a nonlinear relationship
between responses and the size of the transfer, with responses increasing at an
increasing rate with the amount transferred. Thirdly, we also draw attention to the
fact that inheritances may come with “strings attached”. Parents have expectations
and aspirations for their children, which means that they have opinions on how the
intergenerational transfers are used (Becker, 1991; Haveman and Wolfe, 1995; Chami,
1998), and consumption of leisure may be seen as an inferior activity, as Andrew
Carnegie seemed to maintain. Intergenerational transfers may follow a replication
norm, where parents step into a chain of intergenerational transfers, which is referred
to as the “golden rule of bequests” (Bevan and Stiglitz, 1979) or “indirect reciprocity”
(Arrondel and Masson, 2006). If such constraints are working, we expect recipients
without children to show stronger responses than recipients who are constrained by
having offspring.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present findings from the
literature on Carnegie effects and refer to some relevant perspectives and studies
given our focus on response heterogeneity. The empirical approach is presented in
Section 3, and results are discussed in Sections 4 and 5. First, in Section 4, we
present overall estimates of the Carnegie effect for all recipients and for recipients of
large transfers. In Section 5 heterogeneity is further discussed by addressing age
dependency, including responses of people being eligible to early retirement pension,
and by providing separate estimates for people being potentially restricted by having
own heirs. Results of robustness tests are reported in Section 6, whereas Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 Carnegie magnitudes
2.1 Idiosyncratic income effect
In a model with perfect foresight, as the structural life cycle labor supply model of
Heckman and MaCurdy (1980, 1982), inheritance is anticipated and fully absorbed,
yielding a downward shift in the entire life cycle profile of labor, and no immediate
response would follow the receipt of inheritance. However, there are several reasons
for expecting any potential labor supply effects to materialize shortly after the actual
transfer of resources.
6
Firstly, there are uncertainty about both the timing and the amount of inheri-
tance, which can generate a wealth shock. Recipients may receive larger or smaller
inheritances than expected, dependent on how much of the wealth that is consumed
by the parents, to what extent people or organizations outside the family, such as
religious movements, are supported through transfers inter vivos or through testa-
ment, and to what degree parents are able and willing to divide unequally between
children. Secondly, although inheritances may be anticipated, credit constraints may
prevent the heirs from incorporating the inheritance into their budget. Finally, risk
averse recipients will avoid using money they do not fully control.
There is a sizable literature of life cycle models, where contemporaneous income
are allowed to be affected by a transfer, see e.g., Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1997).
Thus, given that inheritances are not perfectly foreseen, and assuming a positive
income effect on the consumption of leisure, we expect to observe reduced work effort
after the transfer. One obvious reduction in labor supply may come from children’s
mourning following the death of a parent. Though we would expect grief to add
to the responses in the very short run, it is unlikely to be an important aspect in
a longer time perspective. In addition, we may expect to see a reduction in work
prior to inheriting because of the care of an ailing parent prior to death.
Even though the change in labor supply as a result of bequest resembles the
income effect of the standard labor supply literature, see reviews of the latter in
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Keane (2011), there are several reasons for
not using estimates of the average labor supply income effect to represent the
Carnegie response. Some of these idiosyncrasies of intergenerational transfers are
further explored in the following with reference to the heterogeneity of the Carnegie
effect.3The first type of heterogeneity is, however, inspired by findings of the labor
supply literature, namely that there are fixed cost of adjustments, such as search
costs and other adjustments costs, which means that agents can be expected to
respond only to changes that are sufficiently large. A change in unearned income
will only have effect if it exceeds the fixed costs of finding a new optimum, see
Cogan (1981), Altonji and Paxson (1992), and Chetty (2012). Thus, we expect to
see responses increasing at an increasing rate with the size of the transfer. Other
3In addition, there is substantial uncertainty about the magnitude of labor supply responses in
general, see for instance the different assessments in Chetty (2012) and Keane and Rogerson (2012).
Correspondingly, there is no general agreement concerning the size of the income effect (Kimball
and Shapiro, 2008; Hines, 2013). One line of research uses information on winners of lotteries to
obtain income response estimates. For example, Imbens et al. (2001) estimate the propensity to
earn among lottery winners, and find propensities that range from -0.1 to -0.25, but on average
approximately -0.11, and significantly more for those close to retirement age, whereas Kimball and
Shapiro (2008) use hypothetical lottery winners and arrive at estimates close to -0.3.
7
studies of the Carnegie effect, such as Brown et al. (2010), also report such effects.
Next, we discuss age dependency in the Carnegie response. Of course, the
negative fiscal externality of bequests is particularly problematic if people at an
early stage of life (the people Carnegie most likely had in mind) are affected, and
there is permanence in the responses. On the extensive margin, an inheritance
increases the reservation wage, which means that some recipients withdraw from the
labor market. It can be expected that those who already have high income in the
non-work alternative, for instance because of eligibility to public transfer schedules
such as the early retirement scheme, are more responsive.4
An important reason for not treating donations from parents as conventional
lump sum incomes for the beneficiaries is that they may often come with strings
attached. In the exchange model of intergenerational transfers (Bernheim et al.,
1985; Cox, 1987) this is highlighted, as parents use transfers strategically to engender
desired behavior, for instance to obtain attention from their own children. Thus,
according to the exchange model perspective, intergenerational transfers are devices
for controlling children’s actions. Similarly, in an altruism model, it has been focused
on the importance of “having the last word” or controlling the last actions in a
temporal sequence (Hirshleifer, 1977) in order to derive the positive outcomes of the
“rotten kid” behavior; see Becker (1974), Bergstrom (1989) and Bruce and Waldman
(1990) on the rotten-kid theorem and the Samaritan’s dilemma.5
Tied transfers may also come from mutual obligations, resulting from the inter-
actions of attitudes and expectations within the family (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995;
Chami, 1998). There are several variants of this type of family ties in the literature,
characterized by different concepts. For example, Arrondel and Laferrère (2001) use
the term “indirect reciprocity”, meaning a system of transfer between generations
where emotions, expectations and obligations play important roles. “Impure altruism”
is another characterization (Laferrère and Wolff, 2006).6 Such behavior may also
develop into principles of donee behavior characterized as a “golden rule of bequests”
(Bevan and Stiglitz, 1979): people bequeath an equal amount to what they inherited
themselves, plus or minus some adjustments for luck over the life cycle. Irrespective
of the precise mechanism and what terms that are used, we expect that heirs outside
a direct line of kinship are less affected, implying that such effects will manifest in
larger labor supply effects among recipients without children.
4In Norway, all residents are members of the National Insurance Scheme, so there are no
incentives to hold on to a job because of employer-provided health insurance.
5The quote from Andrew Carnegie in the Introduction may indicate that he warned against
children free riding on their parents’ altruism (Samaritan’s dilemma).
6See also Gatti (2005) and Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) on the relationship between altruistic
parents and work incentives for children.
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2.2 Previous studies
As already noted, the literature on Carnegie effects is relatively small and the few
studies are based on data sources of limited size. Most contributions focus on unan-
ticipated bequests, similar to the approach of the present study. A notable exception
to this is Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994), where models with both unanticipated
bequests and perfect foresight are estimated. In the latter case, the inheritance
variable is discounted back to age 25. Two data sets are exploited in the estimation
of the models: the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which include
both inheritors and non-inheritors, and the Treasury’s Estate-Income Tax Match
Sample (EITM), which is a sample of wealthy descendents and their heirs. Joulfaian
and Wilhelm (1994) find that the labor supply responses are small, both under
the perfect foresight and the unanticipated inheritance hypotheses. One possible
explanation put forward is that the PSID data do not adequately represent recipients
of large transfers.
The EITM data are also used by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993). Labor market
behavior of recipients before and after they received inheritances are examined, such
as transitions in and out of the labor force and effects on income growth. Thus,
identification of effects comes from response differences generated by variations
in the size of transfers. They find clear indications that large inheritances reduce
labor force participation, whereas effects on labor earnings are smaller. Brown et al.
(2010) focus on the binary work/retire decision. Using 1994−2002 U.S. survey data
from the Health and Retirement Study, they find a significantly higher probability
of retirement amongst those who receive inheritances, increasing with the size of
the inheritance. They also have the possibility to split bequests into expected and
unexpected, and find higher responses to unexpected inheritances.
The study by Elinder et al. (2012) uses a small panel of wealthy decedents and
their children. They find immediate labor supply effects that increase in the age
of the recipient and the size of the transfer. Moreover, compared to Joulfaian and
Wilhelm (1994), effects are reported to be larger and longer lasting.
3 Empirical framework
3.1 Data descriptions
In contrast to most of the previous literature, the present study uses data from
administrative registers, which means that we can exploit information for the whole
Norwegian population. Behavioral effects in terms of responses in wage income,
early retirement and working hours (on the intensive margin) are discussed, utilizing
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that information from various administrative registers can be linked by unique
personal identification numbers. A key data source is the Inheritance statistics
(Statistics Norway, 2014), based on a register of all Norwegian inheritances by
recipient. Inheritances are reported to the tax authorities whether or not they are
liable for inheritance taxation. The only source of missing observations is that very
small estates are not always electronically registered by the tax authorities.7 Savings
accounts and housing wealth constitute the two largest components of the average
inheritance.8 Further, the Income statistics for persons and families (Statistics
Norway, 2012) gives register-based information about variables such as income (wage
income and all other types of income), wealth, family composition and educational
level. In addition, the Wage statistics (Statistics Norway, 2006) provides data for
weekly hours of work for a sub-sample of the population.9
Important elements of our empirical design are that we follow inheritors over time,
both before and after receipt, and that we let non-heirs represent counter-factual
outcomes (not receiving transfers). Thus, we assign a time window for the transfers
to take place, and make sure that we have at least three years of observations both
before and after the transfer. The time window 2000−2004 is used for transfers,
and what we in the following will refer to as the “year of receipt” therefore varies
between the years in the range from 2000 to 2004 for the observations in the data
set.10
Further, in the descriptions of effects, we refer to “before transfer” and “after
transfer” periods, to examine the behavior of recipients and non-recipients in the
labor market (income, working hours, retirement) for up to six years before and six
years after the transfer. As for the data from the Income statistics for persons and
families, we primarily use information for the years from 1997 to 2010,11 which means
that a person inheriting in 2000 is observed for three “before transfer” years (data for
1997, 1998 and 1999) and in six years of the “after transfer” period (2001−2006). As
the recipients are spread around in the time window 2000−2004, we get data points
7Our data include few inheritances of less than 5,000 NOK ($660 in 1998), as the tax authorities
reduced the administrative burden by not recording estates that were far from generating inheritance
tax.
8Life insurance is included in the inheritance with its cash value. Transfers to trusts is considered
as a non-family transfer, since it is forbidden by law to set up a trust that benefits one’s own
family.
9Note that this information is based on formal or contracted weekly hours of work, not actual
hours.
10We use inheritance statistics covering the period 1998−2006. Persons from households that
we know have inherited in the years outside of 2000−2004 (i.e., in the years 1998, 1999, 2005 and
2006) are excluded.
11In the construction of variables measuring previous income, we use accumulated information
over several years, also involving data from years prior to 1997.
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scattered over the thirteen year period: the transfer year plus six years before and
six years after the transfer. There are no reasons to expect macroeconomic condition
to have had any substantial effects on results, as the period under consideration
is characterized by a large degree of stability. Even though the financial crisis of
2008−2009 affected the Norwegian economy too, effects were much smaller than
seen in other countries (Berg and Eitrheim, 2013).
In Norway, during the period we are studying here, it is unlikely that any reduction
in wage income should stem from a reduction in wage rates. Thus, we interpret
reductions in wage income as generated by adjustments in hours of work, at the
extensive and/or the intensive margin. As we will return to soon, the identification
technique is based on letting non-recipients represent the counter-factual outcome.
A propensity score matching technique is used to match donees and non-donees. To
avoid anticipatory effects, the year three years prior to the transfer year is used for
the matching.
We limit the sample to persons who are between 18 and 66 years old (to avoid
children of school age and old age pensioners)12 and exclude individuals not observed
in all years, except those who enter or exit the sample due to age. As wage income
is used as the main indicator of behavioral response (some evidence on working
hours and early retirement is presented too), the study is restricted to responses of
wage earners. Limiting the study to wage earners means that we exclude persons
who are self-employed prior to inheriting.13 However, we acknowledge that receiving
an inheritance could prompt a switch from wage earning to self-employment, also
noting that transfer of firms to the next generation are examples of bequests coming
with strings attached. Later, in Section 6.3, we explore the possibility that some
wage earners may have used the inheritance as a basis for setting up own business,
i.e., becoming self-employed after inheriting, and to what extent this explains
outcomes. Individuals with zero income in the whole period leading up to the
period of inheritance are also excluded.14 These restrictions leave us with 1,684,967
persons, followed over at least five years. For 317,945 of these individuals we also
have information about hours of work over the period 1998−2006, obtained from
the Wage statistics.
12Note that the effect on early retirement is one of the outcomes we are interested in. The formal
retirement age in Norway is 67.
13Self-employment is defined as having higher total business income than wage income in the
years before the transfer.
14Five percent of the observations are excluded due to self-employment, mostly men. An
additional five percent are excluded due to zero wage income. These are mainly people on social
security benefits, along with a few students. Although we exclude observations with zero income
prior to inheriting, we allow for zero wage income after inheriting.
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Figure 1. Population densities and inheritance
For married couples where one of the partners receives an inheritance, findings
from the labor supply literature suggest the that the spouse’s labor supply is affected
by changes in the budget constraint too, see for example Blundell and MaCurdy
(1999). An advantage of our paper, compared to the previous literature, is that we
account for effects on both the heir and the spouse of the heir. We assume that
couples have a common economy, implying that both heirs and spouses are defined
as recipients.15 As we have the information about who is the direct recipient, we will
later (in Section 5) look at whether the effect of inheritance receipt differs between
the direct recipient and the spouse. Persons who live in a multiple-person household,
but are classified as singles, are excluded from the data set.16 Note also that all
income and wealth variables are log transformed.17
15We assign the full inheritance sum to both the recipient and the spouse. As matching is not
dependent on the sum of inheritance, dividing the transfer between the spouses would not matter.
The composition of the “large inheritance” sample would however be somewhat affected.
16These are mostly grown children registered as living in their parent’s household, and represent
a small number of observations.
17All log transformations are done using the value of the variable plus one, to avoid log(0).
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics, initial and matched samples
Initial sample Matched sample
Non- Inheritors Inheritors, Inheritors Control Inheritors, Control
inheritors large sums1 group large sums1 group
Mean values2
Age 40.0 45.0 45.4 45.1 45.1 45.6 45.5
Wage income 218 240 257 237 237 253 253
Capital income 16 22 30 20 24 25 30
Business income 3.3 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.2
Financial wealth 140 222 283 187 198 239 255
Housing wealth 89 107 117 106 105 115 113
Debt 304 290 309 272 273 288 290
Male .481 .476 .482 .459 .458 .464 .463
No of adults 1.62 1.77 1.76 1.78 1.77 1.77 1.77
No of children .823 .758 .768 .770 .760 .777 .775
High school .471 .480 .465 .482 .481 .470 .472
University .278 .323 .377 .317 .319 .370 .369
High school father .337 .307 .330 .304 .304 .329 .332
High school mother .322 .300 .329 .295 .295 .324 .324
University father .100 .104 .131 .100 .100 .127 .126
University mother .061 .061 .073 .058 .057 .070 .068
Preceding labor inc3 1,039 1,218 1,311 1,204 1,199 1,291 1,282
Preceding capital inc3 52 85 119 72 81 99 108
Preceding business inc3 28 36 37 38 37 40 38
Inheritance4
Mean . 318 669 315 . 662 .
Standard deviation . 491 678 467 . 633 .
Median . 199 496 198 . 494 .
No of persons5 1,524,254 160,713 58,307 141,726 141,766 51,207 51,250
1 Inheritances over 300,000 NOK ($1=7.55 NOK)
2 Measured in 1999, before all transfers. All income and wealth variables measured in 1000s 1998 NOK.
3 Summed over the period from 1993 to 1998.
4 Transfers recieved in the period 2000−2004.
5 Not all persons in the matched sample are in the 1999 data set, which explains differences in the number of observations.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics, sub-sample defined by hours of work information
Hours of work sample Matched sample
Non- Inheritors Inheritors Control
inheritors group
Mean values1
Age 42.2 45.8 45.7 45.8
Weekly hours of work 33.3 33.4 33.2 33.2
Wage income 261 268 265 266
Capital income 6.5 7.8 6.7 7.2
Business income 1.9 2.7 3.0 3.0
Financial wealth 97 132 112 114
Housing wealth 101 109 106 108
Debt 296 259 250 251
Male .403 .397 .379 .387
No of adults 1.71 1.82 1.82 1.81
No of children .931 .854 .859 .844
High school .412 .401 .405 .409
University .459 .496 .490 .487
High school father .355 .332 .335 .332
High school mother .348 .327 .330 .331
University father .113 .117 .115 .116
University mother .067 .070 .068 .066
Preceding labor inc2 1,258 1,347 1,328 1,332
Preceding capital inc2 24 32 29 32
Preceding business inc2 14 20 21 20
Inheritance3
Mean . 321 327 .
Standard deviation . 466 389 .
Median . 208 217 .
No of persons 276,152 37,274 26,112 26,106
1 Measured in the last pre-transfer year (1999). All income and wealth variables
measured in 1998 NOK ($1=7.55 NOK).
2 Summed over the period from 1993 to 1998.
3 Transfers received in the period 2000−2004.
4 Not all persons in the matched sample are in the 1999 data set,
which explains differences in the number of observations.
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Table 1 and Table 2 show descriptive statistics for the full sample and the
sample which is restricted by access to information about hours of work, respectively.
Pointing forward to separate analyses for recipients of larger transfers, we also show
separate figures for persons who have inherited more than 300,000 NOK, which
is roughly the mean inheritance.18 The tables clearly suggest that the recipients
are not similar to the rest of the population, reflecting that this is not a randomly
selected group. Further, the differences are not coming from deviations in age only:
for example, there is a larger fraction of recipients (32 percent) that have attained
college or university degrees than non-recipients (28 percent), and this fraction is
increasing with the size of the inheritance.19
From the National Educational Register we have information about parents’
level of education, but the data does not contain information about parental age.
However, there is a close connection between recipients’ age and parents’ age at
the time of their death. Bequests from parents in Norway are normally left by the
last surviving spouse, so if one parent dies early, this will not affect the timing of
inheritance. Of course, some inheritances may originate from other relatives. In our
data, about 75 percent of the inheritances are from parents to children. For the
remaining transfers, it is not possible to distinguish between different donors, such
as grandparents, siblings, etc.
Note also that for the sub-sample for which we have observations on working
hours (Table 2), the differences between non-inheritors and inheritors are smaller (in
particular for wage income), probably due to the requirement, in the establishment
of this data set, that all persons work continuously throughout the whole period.
This data set includes all public sector employees, but covers only parts of the private
sector. Characteristics of public sector employees give a higher share of females and
a higher education level in the “working hours sample”, compared to the general
sample.
Figure 1 further elaborates on age differences, comparing age densities of inher-
itors with age densities of the general population (as represented by the data set
established for the present analysis) for the year 1999. The figure confirms that the
population of inheritors is not representative of the general population. Because
of the natural timing of bequests, inheritors are on average older that the rest of
the population, which will result in higher observed pre-inheritance wage income
18All sums are deflated using the consumer price index, and given as Norwegian kroner (NOK)
in 1998; $1=7.55 NOK according to the exchange rate in 1998, which means that 300,000 NOK
equals $40,000.
19Also, the fact that wage income increases with the inheritance size differs from the Swedish
sample studied by Elinder et al. (2012), where high transfers are correlated with low wage income.
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and wealth in this group. On average the recipients are 45 years old in 1999, which
means that they are 46−50 years old at the time of inheriting. In addition, the age
distribution of inheritors peaks at around age 55, whereas for the general population,
between 18 and 66 years old, the peak is at age 35. In the next subsection we
discuss how to obtain unbiased estimates of the Carnegie effect, given that recipients
belong to a selected group, and given that we use the non-recipients to describe
counter-factual outcomes.
3.2 Data balancing with propensity score matching
A possible identification strategy is to study only the recipients over time (before
and after the transfer), as done in Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993), refraining from us-
ing information on non-recipients. However, results are then in danger of being
confounded by unobserved time effects, and it is challenging to disentangle the
Carnegie effect from other life cycle adjustments. When employing observations
of non-recipients, there exist various methods to handle the co-variate differences
just described. We use matching to improve the balance between the data sets of
recipients and non-recipients. Matching techniques hold the promise of including
the co-variates in a more flexible way than standard parametric regression methods,
as regressions may be vulnerable to the curse-of-dimensionality problem, see for
example Imbens (2004), Blundell and Dias (2009), Imbens and Wooldridge (2009)
and Huber et al. (2013). In addition, we also combine matching with regression
analysis in some parts of the analysis.
In the identification of the Carnegie effects we exploit that there are many
households who have characteristics and a predicted probability of inheriting close
to the households actually receiving transfers. Therefore we use variables such as
age, education, previous wage income and wealth to construct the propensity score
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), i.e., the estimated probability that a person receives
an inheritance given the values of all variables. As the propensity score function
is not directly related to the outcome variables, estimates of effects obtained via
propensity score matching are expected to deliver results which are more robust to
mis-specification, compared to results of standard methods, such as linear regression
(Huber et al., 2013).
Using the treatment terminology, and noting that we use nearest-neighbor
matching, the Carnegie effect (CE), αCE, can be seen as an estimate of the average
treatment effect on the treated,20
20As the recipients belong to a selected group of the population, the effects derived can not be
interpreted as overall average effects.
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E
[
Y 1i − Y 0i |D = 1
]
= αCE = 1
NR
∑
i∈R
Yi − ∑
j∈NR(i)
Yj
 .
Thus, outcome for individual i after inheriting, Y 1i , compared to the outcome without
inheritance, Y 0i , is empirically addressed by letting person j representing the no-
inheritance situation for individual i. In other words, the identification relies on the
matched individuals providing the counter-factual outcome of not receiving bequests.
In the main specification we use nearest-neighbor matching, which means finding
one match for each recipient; no weights are involved and the number of recipients
dictates the number of matches, NR. As discussed by Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), the number of observations matched to each treated
observation is a trade-off between bias and precision. Using more matches, the
average difference in propensity score between treated and non-treated observations
increase, as each subsequent match is further away from the treated observation. At
the same time, as more matches allow for more information to be used, precision
increases. With a very large number of treated and control observations, we think
precision is a less pressing concern than bias. Nonetheless, we have also used a
specification where each treated observation is matched with three controls, and the
results of this alternative matching methodology will be referred to in Section 4.21
The two main identification assumptions in matching are un-confoundedness and
overlap (or common support) (Imbens, 2004). The assumption of un-confoundedness
means that, conditional on the propensity score, the potential outcomes are indepen-
dent of treatment. We argue that the timing of inheritance receipt is to a large degree
coincidental, and that the large set of control variables available makes it less likely
that there are biases in the comparison between recipients and non-recipients; thus,
the un-confoundedness assumption holds. The matching is done three years before
the receipt of inheritance, in order to avoid possible anticipatory effects (people
adjusting to the transfer in advance). Matching is done with replacement, and
within years (or equivalently, there is exact matching on years) to avoid time effects
affecting outcomes.22 The non-recipients are defined by not having inherited in the
period used for observing inheritances (1998−2006). This means that they may have
already inherited, or may inherit in the period after 2006. The possibility of later
transfers may introduce a downward bias to our estimates of Carnegie effects.23
21As an additional robustness check, we also use an inverse probability weighting estimator
(Hirano et al., 2003).
22There is a large number of control persons available for comparison within each year. We also
impose a caliper of 0.00001, to assure that no matches are too different.
23Note that in Section 6 we estimate the effects on a sample conditioned on the control group
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Given the outcomes we investigate, pre-inheritance wage income is an important
matching variable. Further, as inheritors are older and have higher education than
non-inheritors (see Table 1), and being in a couple increases the probability of
inheriting (two are more likely to inherit than one), these variables are obvious
candidates in the estimation of the propensity score. We have explored several
different specifications to find the best fit. To guide the specification we have looked
at how closely the co-variates of the matched treated and control group fit, using
t-tests. In addition, inspired by Dehejia and Wahba (2002), we have split the sample
into 10 equally large groups sorted on the propensity score, and looked at the balance
of co-variates within the groups.
The preferred specification uses a logit procedure,24 with the following explanatory
variables: log of wage, capital and business income; log of financial wealth, housing
wealth, vacation housing wealth and debt; log aggregated wage, capital and business
income for a period before the matching year (from 1993 to the year before matching);
log square terms for the previous variables; age dummies; gender; a dummy for
marriage/cohabitation; an interacted term of gender and marriage; and dummies for
high school and university education (for the person as well as for the person’s father
and mother). The results for the participation model is presented in Appendix A,
see Table A.1, along with mean equality tests in Table A.2. The mean equality test
shows that our matching procedure is successful in balancing the data set over the
dimensions included in the model. Descriptive statistics of the matched samples of
inheritors and non-inheritors are presented in Table 1 and Table 2.
As the present study discusses the heterogeneity of the Carnegie effect, examining
how it varies with respect to the size of the transfer, the age of recipients, the existence
of new heirs in the chain, and the recipients’ eligibility to early retirement, we also
give a brief overview of the empirical strategies to that end. The effect of early
retirement is discussed by using early retirement pension take-up as the dependent
variable (whereas income or working hours are used as dependent variables for
the other dimensions). The identification of effects of age and new heirs combines
propensity score matching and OLS regressions.25 Given that we believe we have
having parents alive over the whole period, and recipients inheriting their last living parent.
24The matching is implemented in Stata with the package psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi, 2014).
25Many authors have discussed the benefits of combining matching or propensity score weighting
and linear regression. Most of the discussion is aimed at ways in which regression adjustment
can improve efficiency of the matching method. The intuition behind using both methods is that
regression adjustment can be used to alleviate the effects of remaining co-variate imbalances, using
supplementary regression analysis to increase efficiency (Heckman et al., 1997; Rubin and Thomas,
2000; Abadie and Imbens, 2006). The additional regression method is mainly aimed at situations
where the treament and comparison groups are unequally sized (matching with replacement), in
which case one may use a weighted regression, where the comparison units are weighted by the
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obtained a balanced matched data set, it is straightforward to include interaction
effects in a regression framework. Therefore, in contrast to the more common
practice of examining subgroups, one at a time, we estimate an equation where we
(in practice) let the Carnegie effect, αCE, be explained by various characteristics
and interactions between them, including dummies for age group and whether the
recipient has own heirs or not.26
4 Size and non-linearity of the Carnegie effect
First, we establish to what extent an overall Carnegie effect can be found, and
in case it is, how it varies over time and with respect to the size of the transfer.
We discuss the heterogeneity of the Carnegie effect with respect to the size of the
transfer by employing a separately matched data set, whereas we in the next section
study heterogeneity by adding in explanatory variables directly in regressions, based
on the matched samples.
The first column of Table 3 presents estimates of the effect on wage income of
receiving an inheritance by reporting average differences in log wage income between
recipients and non-recipients over the thirteen year time period: six years before
and six years after the transfer year.27 Recall that outcome estimates are based on
separate estimation for each period on all matched pairs.Given the identification
strategy, it is reassuring to see that there are no signs of effects on income prior to
the transfer. Moreover, we see a drop in wage income among inheritors after the
transfer, in accordance with the Carnegie conjecture and previous findings in the
literature (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1993; Joulfaian and Wilhelm, 1994). When looking
at results for “all inheritances”, there seem to be a gradual and temporary wage
income response to the receipt of an inheritance: the coefficients turn negative at
the year of receipt and increases gradually thereafter until the second year.28 The
point estimates suggest that the inheritors reduce their income by approximately 2
percent two years after the transfer. However, none of the estimates are statistically
significant.
Table 1 shows that mean inheritance is approximately 30 percent higher than
number of times that they are matched to the treated unit. Since we have access to very large
data sets, with ample possibilities of finding suitable matches, regression adjustment in matching
is not employed here.
26This setup is similar to Djebbari and Smith (2008), although they also control for idiosyncratic
heterogeneity. Another difference is that our estimations involve a full interaction of all co-variates.
27Remember that the matching is based on individual characteristics three years before the
transfer.
28We do not know at what time of the year the inheritance is received. For those inheriting in
e.g., December, it seems reasonable that the adjustment process lasts well into year one.
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Table 3. Effect of inheritance on wage income. Average difference between recipients
and non-recipients
All inheritances Above mean
inheritances1
Est. SE Est. SE
6 years before -.0069 .0164 .0083 .0247
5 years before -.0073 .0129 -.0009 .0200
4 years before -.0055 .0111 .0026 .0176
3 years before2 .0025 .0100 .0015 .0162
2 years before .0155 .0103 .0071 .0166
1 year before .0169 .0109 .0053 .0176
Year of receipt -.0050 .0117 -.0266 .0190
1 year after -.0111 .0127 -.0845∗∗ .0205
2 years after -.0163 .0134 -.1007∗∗ .0219
3 years after -.0034 .0143 -.0911∗∗ .0232
4 years after -.0006 .0153 -.0748∗∗ .0249
5 years after .0014 .0163 -.0806∗∗ .0266
6 years after .0149 .0173 -.0705∗ .0283
No of matches3 142,882 51,597
1 Inheritances larger than 300,000 NOK ($1=7.55 NOK).
2 Year of matching.
3 Maximum number of matches, i.e. from the year of
matching until one year after receipt.
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01
mean wage income for the recipients, while the median inheritance is lower than
the mean wage. In other words, there is a substantial share of inheritances that are
smaller than the average wage income. If there are fixed adjustment costs in the
optimization process, as suggested by several studies of the labor supply literature, it
is likely that smaller inheritances will have small or no effect on labor supply. Table
3 presents separate estimates for inheritances above 300,000 NOK (roughly the mean
inheritance).29 For larger inheritances we find a much more distinct pattern than for
the full sample, in accordance with the hypothesis of adjustment costs. Again we
find a gradually stronger negative effect on wage income in the first years after the
transfer, reaching a maximum effect of about 10 percent two year after inheriting.
In the following years, the effect seems to diminish somewhat, though it is still 7−8
percent five and six years after the transfer.30
29As the matching is done separately for each subgroup, recipients of large inheritances are
matched with persons based on a participation model with different parameter values than the one
used for all recipients.
30In Table 3, standard errors are those calculated by default by psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi,
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Since the estimated effects are small for recipients of small transfers, one could
alternatively let these recipients enter into the control group, and compare them to
those who get large inheritances. This procedure would be similar to the framework
of e.g., Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993) and Elinder et al. (2012), where identification is
based on the size of the transfer. When doing this, we find (as expected) lower
estimates, in particular in the first years after inheriting, with an estimated response
of minus 3 percent in the first year, approximately minus 5 percent in the subsequent
second, third and fourth years, before rising to minus 7−8 percent in the fifth and
sixth years.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the results in Table 3.31 Results
using a specification with three-nearest neighbor matching are presented in Appendix
B, Figure B.1, showing that results are very similar to the results of Table 3 (as already
denoted, the standard errors are somewhat smaller). In Appendix B (Figure B.2)
we also show estimations results when employing an inverse probability weighting
(IPW) estimator (Hirano et al., 2003), for all inheritances and for large inheritances,
respectively. This method implies that all observations are used in a regression,
which is weighted by the inverse of the estimated propensity score. The propensity
score is estimated using the same variables as in our matching models. The IPW
estimation results are close to estimates derived by the main matching specification,
although the effects for large inheritances are somewhat smaller: the maximum
effect is around 7 percent. It is also worth noting that the standard errors in the
later years are larger.32
Table 4 shows a further split of responses by the size of the inheritance, and
confirms that the effect on labor supply in increasing in the size of the transfer.
Instead of matching separately by each subgroup, we here estimate an OLS on
the matched sample for all recipients, with a dummy specification for each of the
quantiles 0-p50, p50-p75, p75-p90, p90-p95, and above p95, and for each year
separately. Despite smaller coefficients and less statistical significance, the overall
pattern of a post-inheritance decline in wage income is found for inheritance above
2014). The calculation does not account for the fact that the propensity score is estimated. As a
robustness check, we have also calculated standard errors by bootstrap (not reported in the paper).
There are only small differences between the two sets of standard errors, and no clear direction in
the differences.
31We have also obtained estimation results for the same specification when using matching
without replacement. Effects for the “large inheritance” dataset are somewhat smaller, but we
basically see the same pattern as in Table 3.
32When using the matching estimator, only matches where both control and observation are
present in data are used, which excludes some observations in later years. The use of the IPW
estimator implies that all available observations are included, and data sets may thus be unbalanced
toward the end of the estimation period.
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Table 4. Effect of inheritance on wage income, by size of inheritance1
Size of inheritance
0-p50 p50-p75 p75-p90 p90-p95 p95+
6 years before -.016 -.013 .007 .049 .082
5 years before -.011 -.013 .032 .027 .052
4 years before -.015 .008 .030 .038 -.004
3 years before2 -.005 .010 .021 .027 .012
2 years before .004 .040 .037 .001 .031
1 year before .014 .034 .032 .010 .014
Year of receipt .003 .003 .008 -.005 -.064
1 year after .018 -.011 -.026 -.034 -.118**
2 years after .032 -.027 -.031 -.050* -.173**
3 years after .040 -.020 -.014 -.056* -.200**
4 years after .039 -.020 -.003 -.053* -.187**
5 years after .048* -.020 .005 -.068* -.192**
6 years after .059** -.030 .020 -.060* -.162**
Inheritance/wage income
Mean 1.5 5.1 7.0 11.1 26.3
Median 0.3 1.2 2.0 3.1 5.2
1 Yearly OLS on the matched sample for all inheritances with a dummy
for each of the quantiles 0-p50, p50-p75, p75-p90, p90-p95, and p95+.
2 Year of matching.
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01
the median. To illustrate the relative importance of inheritance with respect to
income, in the lower part of the table, we report the mean and median inheritance
in relation to income across groups.33
To illustrate the economic implications of the Carnegie effects that we find,
we use the (significant) estimates for the large transfers, see Table 3. We use the
estimated average reduction in income, 8.5 percent, to calculate the corresponding
decrease in yearly working hours, and then use figures for how many who receive
large inheritances to obtain an estimated loss in working hours. Based on a measure
for the average labor supply of Norwegians in 2004, the income reduction corresponds
to a reduction of 130 hours of work per recipients of large transfers, which in turn
means that approximately 800 man-years are withdrawn from the labor market in
one year. When also accounting for the effect lasting for six years and aligning to
national figures (for one year), our results correspond to the labor supply being 0.24
percent higher if there was no Carnegie effect, i.e., as obtained if the government
33Although intuitively appealing, studying income responses to inheritance weighted by income
gives interpretational difficulties, as income is the dependent variable and the variable inheritance
over income is (strongly) negatively correlated with income levels.
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confiscated all transfers.
Given this estimate of aggregate Carnegie effects on working hours, one may
speculate on to what extent the recent abolishment of the Norwegian inheritance
tax (in 2014) has influenced labor supply. In the period under consideration, the
Norwegian inheritance schedule implied that transfers were taxed progressively, by
20 percent at the maximum, above 550,000 NOK.34 Simple calculations based on
the average large transfer, reported in Table 1, suggest that recipients on average
received 800,000 NOK before tax, and paid approximately 135,000 NOK in taxes.
We may approach the effect of the tax relief following a hypothetical elimination
of the inheritance tax in 2004 by uprating the estimates of Table 3 linearly by the
increase in income. For example, in terms of effects on tax revenue, the loss working
through less income taxation corresponds to an additional 4 percent reduction in the
revenue, when the direct loss from the abolition of the scheme is 1.7 billion NOK.35
−14
−12
−10
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
Effect
(percent)
−6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Year
All
inheritances
Confidence interval,
all
Above mean
inheritances
Confidence interval,
above mean
The average difference in log wage between recipients and non−recipients,
and the 95 percent confidence interval.
Maximum number of matches 142,882 (all) and 51,597 (above mean).
Figure 2. Effect of inheritance on wage income
As denoted by the literature focusing on the measurement of income responses
to changes in taxes, see Saez et al. (2012), income responses reflect a diversity of
34For children and grandchildren. The top rate was 30 percent for recipients not in a direct line
of the deceased.
35However, note that this calculation only accounts for effects working through recipients of
large transfers.
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Figure 3. Effect of inheritance on the probability of reducing working hours.
Sub-sample with information about working hours
behavioral responses. To obtain separate estimates for the effect on working hours
at the intensive margin, we use the sub-sample with information about hours of
work over the period 1998−2006. Recall from Section 3 that that individuals in
this sample need to be employed over the whole observation period, and that we
only have information about contractual working. People who retire or completely
stop working will not show up in this sample, which implies that only effects on the
intensive margin are obtained.
When using the same identification strategy as for income, we obtain results for
working hours that are hard to interpret due to very large standard errors (see Table
B.1 in the Appendix). We therefore use a somewhat modified empirical strategy,
defining the outcome by a dummy indicator, which takes the value 0 if working
hours are reduced from their level in the year of matching and 1 if hours of work
are similar or higher. The matching procedure is the same as previously used. The
results are presented in Figure 3, showing that the share of people cutting their
working time is up to one percentage point larger for recipients. However, the effects
are statistically significant only in the two years nearest to the transfer.
Our Carnegie effect results, although using another method for identification,
are qualitatively similar to results in Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994), in finding small
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change in working hours, and somewhat larger changes in wage income. We also
confirm the result from Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993) that large inheritances lead to
stronger labor supply responses. Quantitatively, our estimates of the effect on labor
earnings are larger than in both of these papers. The time pattern of the labor
supply responses is similar to the findings of Elinder et al. (2012): the effect is
strongest after a couple of years, then decreasing over time.
5 Further response heterogeneity
So far, we have split the initial sample into recipients with an inheritance smaller
than the mean inheritance (smaller than 300,000 NOK) and recipients with above
mean inheritance. When we in the following discuss how Carnegie effects vary
with respect to the age of recipients and the existence of new heirs, we use the
“large transfer” sub-sample and employ the propensity score matching technique in
combination with regression analysis, as discussed in Section 3. Estimation results
are obtained by employing a standard OLS regression, including the inheritance
indicator and its interactions with dummies for age group and whether the recipient
has heirs or not. We also present estimation results for some of the other co-variates:
gender, marital status, dependent children36, and educational level. Educational
level is included since it may be a proxy for high income, or may influence financial
literacy and ability to plan.
Note that the specification includes direct effects of all additional co-variates
and all possible interactions between the co-variates. With a fully flexible model
where all characteristics are allowed to interact with each other, it is difficult to
evaluate the point estimates. Therefore, we compute the average marginal effect of
inheritance on wage income for each subgroup. The marginal effect is the difference
in the predicted margins of log wage income for those who inherit compared to those
who do not inherit within each group; for example, for female recipients compared
to female non-recipients. Table 5 shows these marginal effects by age, existence of
heirs, gender, marital status, dependents and level of education, together with the
benchmark - the overall marginal effect of inheritance (reported in the first column
of Table 5).
Carnegie effects for four age groups are reported in Table 5. The average age of
heirs (at receipt) is about 49 years, which is probably a higher age than that of the
sons who Andrew Carnegie had in mind when he was concerned about a “general
deadening of talents and energies”. Moreover, Table 5 confirms that responses vary
36Dependent children are defined as children younger than 19 years old and living at home.
Direct heirs, or offspring, is a wider definition, as it also includes grown children not living at home.
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Table 5. Marginal effects1 of inheritance on wage income. Sub-sample conditioned
on larger bequests2
Age in the year of inheritance Direct heirs
Overall Age 21-42 Age 43-49 Age 50-55 Age 56-60 No Yes
6 years before -.003 -.018 .015 -.037 .013 -.102 .006
5 years before -.016 -.035 -.016 -.056 .014 -.117 -.006
4 years before -.014 -.099 -.009 -.052 .044 -.104 -.004
3 years before -.012 -.090** -.031 -.025 .043 -.096 -.003
2 years before -.006 -.062 -.026 -.022 .041 -.109* .004
1 year before -.007 -.052 -.026 -.006 .024 -.173** .011
Year of receipt -.038* -.153** -.050 -.028 .017 -.230** -.017
1 year after -.095** -.212** -.089* -.078 -.051 -.294** -.072**
2 years after -.108** -.192** -.035 -.118** -.101** -.290** -.088**
3 years after -.099** -.151** -.062 -.104** -.090** -.299** -.077**
4 years after -.087** -.122* -.034 -.088 -.098** -.225** -.071**
5 years after -.096** -.144** .024 -.095 -.143** -.159* -.089**
6 years after -.082** -.162** .060 -.075 -.130** -.170* -.072**
Educational level
Gender Marital status Dep. child(ren) High College
Male Female Couple Single No Yes school /Univ.
6 years before .019 -.022 .004 -.033 -.016 .019 -.012 .010
5 years before .001 -.032 -.028 .024 -.024 -.004 -.017 -.016
4 years before .011 -.036 -.014 -.014 .002 -.041 .003 -.043
3 years before -.001 -.022 .002 -.063 -.005 -.024 .014 -.057*
2 years before .009 -.020 .001 -.036 .002 -.020 .010 -.035
1 year before -.008 -.006 .002 -.042 .000 -.019 .022 -.056*
Year of receipt -.023 -.051* -.022 -.094** -.010 -.083** -.014 -.078**
1 year after -.080** -.107** -.065** -.196** -.080** -.119** -.082** -.116**
2 years after -.091** -.123** -.078** -.213** -.110** -.106** -.092** -.135**
3 years after -.093** -.104** -.070** -.202** -.105** -.090** -.088** -.118**
4 years after -.097** -.078** -.058* -.188** -.098** -.070 -.073** -.110**
5 years after -.084* -.106** -.062* -.216** -.125** -.053 -.112** -.071
6 years after -.072 -.090** -.048 -.198** -.125** -.020 -.103** -.048
1 Marginal effect of a discrete change from 0 to 1.
2 Inheritances larger than 300,000 NOK ($1=7.55 NOK).
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01
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across age groups, with the youngest and oldest age groups showing large responses,
while results for recipients in their forties and early fifties are found to be smaller
and less significant. These results suggest that transfer magnitudes are not large
enough to move middle-aged people away from their stable positions in the labor
market. For the oldest inheritors we see a pattern of declining wage income over the
entire period after inheriting, while the youngest age group responds immediately at
the time of inheritance receipt and exhibit the largest response in the first two years.
With respect to the results for the young recipients, we expect that being a
young inheritor is a good indicator of an unexpected inheritance. Either parents
have died young or the bequest has been left by relatives other than parents, such
as grandparents. One would think that the age at death is a good indication of
the unexpectedness of an inheritance. Since bequest from parents in Norway are
(predominantly) left by the last surviving spouse, the rare incidence of both parents
dying early may explain unexpected inheritance. In such an unlikely event, one
would expect the mourning period to be important. Alternatively, bequests from
someone other than parents is also likely to be unexpected. Thus, we believe that the
responses among young recipients may reflect the effect of an unforeseen inheritance,
more than for other age groups. Furthermore, young individuals or households are
more likely to be liquidity constrained, which can explain responses in the short run
even when inheritances are anticipated.37
Since we observe a pattern of steadily declining wage income for the age group
approaching retirement, it is reasonable to conjecture that this is influenced by
responses on the extensive margin, i.e., that some individuals in this group use the
transfer to withdraw completely from the labor market. In this perspective, the
choice of when to retire is affected by the sudden receipt of an inheritance. We further
investigate extensive margin responses for this age group by providing estimates
for the probability of retirement before normal retirement age. In the Norwegian
public pension scheme the retirement age is 67, but early retirement is available
from age 62. Uptake of an early retirement pension before the formal retirement age
(67 years old) is eligible to employees that participate in a pension scheme through
a collective agreement, called AFP. The self-employed are not eligible to the scheme.
The AFP-scheme covers the public sector and about half of the employees in the
private sector. In the time window for which we measure transfers of inheritance,
37We have experimented with an additional indicator for liquidity constraint, the degree of
loan-to-income (LTI). We find larger responses for recipients with high LTI (3 or more), but also
that the marginal effects are not statistically significantly different from marginal effects for heirs
with lower LTIs. We conclude that the potential effect of being liquidity constrained is most likely
captured by age.
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2000−2004, approximately 20 percent of all persons in the age group 62−66 were on
the early retirement scheme.
The relationship between early retirement and inheritance is described in Figure 4,
where the outcome is the difference in the share of inheritors and non-inheritors who
have taken early retirement. The share of inheritors that retire early is consistently
around two percentage points higher than the share among non-inheritors, though
the difference in shares is not statistically significant.38 However, the results point
in the same direction as the findings of Brown et al. (2010), who show that the
probability of retirement increases for inheritors in the U.S.
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Figure 4. Effect of inheritance on early retirement. Sub-sample conditioned on
larger bequests
While Table 5 highlights the varying response by characteristics of the inheritor,
Table 6 presents evidence on whether these marginal effects are significantly different
across groups. Even though point estimates suggest that female responses are
stronger, there is no significant difference between the responses of male and female
recipients. However, we see that single recipients, statistically significantly, reduce
their labor supply more than recipients that are in a couple.39
38Because we condition on two post-matching years, and a maximum age of 67, there are
relatively few observations being eligible for early retirement, and the standard errors are large.
39As stated in Section 3.1, we assume that couples have a common economy, implying that
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Table 6. Difference in marginal effects between groups of recipients
Age group Dep. College/
No heirs 21-421 50-551 56-601 Female Single child univ.
6 years before -.108 -.033 -.052 -.002 -.041 -.037 .035 .022
5 years before -.111 -.019 -.040 .030 -.033 .052 .020 .001
4 years before -.100 -.090 -.043 .053 -.047 -.000 -.043 -.046
3 years before -.093 -.059 .006 .074 -.021 -.065 -.019 -.071*
2 years before -.113* -.036 .004 .067 -.029 -.037 -.022 -.045
1 year before -.184** -.026 .020 .050 .002 -.044 -.019 -.078*
Year of receipt -.213** -.103 .022 .067 -.028 -.072 -.073 -.064
1 year after -.222** -.123* .011 .038 -.027 -.131** -.039 -.034
2 years after -.202** -.157* -.083* -.066 -.032 -.135** .004 -.043
3 years after -.222** -.089 -.042 -.028 -.011 -.132** .015 -.030
4 years after -.154 -.088 -.054 -.064 .019 -.130* .028 -.037
5 years after -.070 -.168* -.119* -.167* -.022 -.154** .072 .041
6 years after -.098 -.222** -.135* -.190* -.018 -.150* .105 .055
1 Age in the year of inheritance. Age 43-49 is the reference group.
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01
The results of Table 6 suggest that the strongest detrimental effect on labor
supply is among those who do not have any direct heirs, i.e., own children of any age,
suggesting that recipients are restricted in their use of bequests by new heirs in the
“family chain”. However, it could be argued that the lack of response among parents
comes from caring for dependent children (children below 18 years of age), or that
dependent children is a proxy for strong attachment to the labor force. The separate
estimation results for the effect of dependent children, see Table 5, do not provide
any clear answers, but given that effects are not statistically significant , they do
not give support to the hypothesis that the effect works through having dependent
children. Thus, although acknowledging the indicative character of this evidence,
we see results which comply with a “strings attached” conjecture (see discussion
of several reasonings behind this pattern in Section 2). The marginal effects for
the group with no direct heirs are the largest responses of all subgroup-responses
reported in Table 5. Thus, this result suggests that there are factors involved which
limit the Carnegie effect.
both heir and spouse are defined as recipients. Since we have information about who the direct
recipient is, we have also looked at whether the effect of inheritance receipt differs between the
direct recipient and the spouse; in other words, if bequests from own parents affect own labor
supply differently compared to bequests from the spouse’s parents. The magnitudes indicate a
stronger response to inheritance from own parents than when the transfer originates from the
spouse’s parents, but differences are not statistically significant.
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6 Robustness checks
6.1 Unobserved heterogeneity
A disadvantage of the propensity score matching estimator is that it only accounts for
observed (and observable) co-variates. If there are unobserved factors that simultane-
ously affect the probability of inheriting and the wage income outcome (selection on
unobservables), the usual matching estimator can be seriously biased. In the presence
of longitudinal data, Heckman et al. (1997) has proposed a combination of matching
methods and difference-in-differences techniques that may accommodate selection
on unobservables and weaken the strong underlying assumptions of both meth-
ods (Blundell and Dias, 2009). According to the matching difference-in-differences
(MDID) technique, time independent unobservable individual effects cancel out by
taking differences over time. Given that we compare recipients and non-recipients
over an observation period (t0, t1), the matching estimator now becomes
αCE =
∑
i∈R
(Yit1 − Yit0)− ∑
j∈NR(i)
(Yjt1 − Yjt0)
 .
Table 7 shows results when applying the MDID method for estimating the effect
of receiving a large transfer. Since we have many observation periods, one must
make a choice with respect to the observation period (t0, t1). The table shows results
for two alternatives: one where t0 is the year before inheriting, and another where
the initial level is based on average wage income in the three years up to the point
of inheriting.
Table 7. Effects of inheritance on wage income in levels and long differences (MDID
estimator). Sub-sample conditioned on larger bequests1
Diff. from mean
Diff. from year of the 3 years
Level before inheriting before inheriting
Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
Year of inheriting -.027 .019 - -
1 year after -.085* .021 -.090** .015 -.089** .016
2 years after -.101** .022 -.105** .018 -.105** .019
3 years after -.091** .023 -.097** .020 -.097** .021
4 years after -.075* .025 -.075** .023 -.075** .023
5 years after -.081 .027 -.080** .025 -.081** .025
6 years after -.071 .028 -.058* .027 -.061* .026
1 Inheritances larger than 300,000 NOK ($1=7.55 NOK).
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01
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The results of Table 7 are encouraging, as estimates based on the MDID technique
are close to the estimates based on levels. These results therefore do not suggest that
unobserved heterogeneity represents a major source of bias. The overall negative
effect on wage income of inheritors after the (large) transfer is approximately nine
percentage points. However, needless to say, the MDID method also relies on
assumptions which may not hold.
6.2 Testing family ties with more parental information
In Section 5 we found that inheritors without own heirs reduced their work effort
more than inheritors with heirs, which was explained by obligations towards later
generations, discouraging recipients with direct heirs from using the inheritance on
own consumption of leisure. In the data used so far we have included all inheritances,
irrespective of the donors kinship. In order to obtain a better test of this hypothesis,
one would ideally restrict to data where bequests are transferred from parent to
child (and not between others). The main reason for not conditioning on kinship in
general is that the register data is not complete with respect to family linkages, and
conditioning on information about parental transfers would cause a large drop in
the number of observations.
Table 8. Marginal effects of inheritance on wage income. Recipients with and
without direct heirs, restricted and previous data set
Restricted sample1 Previous sample2
Direct heirs Diff. Direct heirs Diff.
No Yes No Yes
1 year before -.051 .020 -.071 -.173** .011 -.184**
Year of receipt -.086 .028 -.115 -.230** -.017 -.213**
1 year after -.205** .018 -.224* -.294** -.072** -.222**
2 years after -.208* .033 -.241* -.290** -.088** -.202**
3 years after -.160 .039 -.198 -.299** -.077** -.222**
4 years after -.122 .071 -.194 -.225** -.071** -.154
5 years after -.072 .001 -.072 -.159* -.089** -.070
6 years after -.111 -.004 -.106 -.170* -.072** -.098
No of matches3 17,401 51,669
1Inheritances larger than 300,000 NOK ($1=7.55 NOK) from own parents.
2Inheritances larger than 300,000 NOK ($1=7.55 NOK).
3Maximum number of matches, i.e. from the year of matching until one
year after receipt.
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01
As it is of interest to check to what extent the dissimilar results for inheritors
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with and without direct heirs are replicated in a data set generated by stricter
conditions, we employ a data set in which we have the possibility to link parental
information from the National Population Register. For the inheritors, we require
that the inheritance is left by the last surviving parent, and for the non-recipients,
used in the comparison, we require that at least one parent is alive during the entire
comparison period (which is up to six years after the assigned year of inheritance
receipt). Table 8 presents results for the smaller sample, and compare them to the
initial estimates for the direct heirs/no direct heirs dimension, obtained from Table
5. We see that the tests for significant differences are weakened with the smaller
sample, but that the overall results stand. We still find that recipients with no
direct heirs have a larger propensity to spend the inheritance on leisure. However,
significantly different response estimates are obtained only in the two first years
after inheriting.
6.3 Entrepreneurship
Recall that we exclude the self-employed and restrict the analysis to wage earners,
defined as those having had higher wage income than business income in the years
before transfer. However, we cannot rule out that some inheritors may have used
the acquired funds to start up new businesses. Thus, part of the decline in wage
income could does not reflect increased leisure, but follow from transitions into
self-employment and a start-up period, in which the persons allocate very little
wage income to themselves. Some may also have inherited the ownership of a small
family business and for that reason changed from being a wage earner to becoming
self-employed.
There are some studies that report positive effects of windfall gains (both lotteries
and inheritance) on the probability of entering self-employment, see Lindh and
Ohlsson (1996) using Swedish data, and Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) on British
data. A standard interpretation of a positive windfall effect on entrepreneurship
is that the windfall relaxes liquidity constraints. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994a) and
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994b) use longitudinal data from the US to study both the
transition into self-employment and the probability of survival as an entrepreneur.
They find that receipt of an inheritance has a substantial positive effect on the
decision to become self-employed, both on the amount of capital invested in the
firm and the probability of survival of the firm.
In the data we see that when self-employment is defined as having business
income greater than wage income, there is a small and insignificant increase in the
fraction of self-employed among donees, see Table 9. Furthermore, when using an
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Table 9. Effect of inheritance on the fraction self-employed, wage income, and
business income + wage income. Subsample conditioned on larger bequests1
Fraction Wage income Business income
self-employed + wage income
Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE
6 years before -.0010 .0012 .008 .025 .012 .024
5 years before .0006 .0009 -.001 .020 .000 .019
4 years before .0021 .0008 .003 .018 .016 .017
3 years before2 .0011 .0007 .002 .016 .006 .016
2 years before .0006 .0007 .007 .017 .009 .016
1 year before .0008 .0008 .005 .018 .020 .018
Year of receipt .0008 .0009 -.027 .019 -.013 .019
1 year after .0008 .0010 -.085** .021 -.074** .021
2 years after .0017 .0010 -.101** .022 -.090** .024
3 years after .0011 .0011 -.091** .023 -.056* .025
4 years after .0013 .0011 -.075** .025 -.043 .026
5 years after .0013 .0011 -.081** .027 -.036 .028
6 years after .0022 .0011 -.071* .028 -.020 .029
1 Inheritances larger than 300,000 NOK ($1=7.55 NOK).
2 Year of matching.
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01
even more narrow concept of self-employment, i.e., defined by sole proprietorship, we
find no effect (not reported). However, in Norway there is only a small percentage
of the population who are self-employed, which means that a larger fraction may
have a combination of wage income and income from self-employment. Hence, we
check to what extent our main result holds if we include business income in the
income definition; results are reported in the last column of Table 9. As the effect of
inheritance is smaller for this income concept, these estimation results suggest that
part of the decline in the labor supply of wage earners is substituted by an increase
in business activities, at least in the long run, although it is a very small fraction of
wage earners which actually shifts into self-employment because of inheritance.
7 Summary
Recent discussions of the reasons for taxation of estates or inheritance, as in Kopczuk
(2013), assign a key role for the Carnegie effect in the overall judgment. In this
perspective it is problematic that the literature providing estimates of Carnegie
effects is rather limited. The results of the present study warn against using other
income effect estimates to characterize Carnegie effects, as the response heterogeneity
revealed clearly signifies that Carnegie effects are idiosyncratic, and therefore should
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be obtained from observations of behavioral responses to intergenerational transfers
- simply adopting income effects from other labor supply studies can be highly
misleading. In this perspective, although we believe that results of the present study
are applicable to other economies, one should be aware of the contributions from the
institutional setting too. For example, we have seen effects working through take-up
of early retirement, which is likely influenced by the design of the Norwegian scheme.
We find clear evidence of recipients using bequests to increase their consumption
of leisure shortly after the transfer. For persons close to retirement we find strong
reductions in labor supply, but we find large and significant effects also for younger
inheritors. In addition, short term estimates, as those obtained in this study, most
likely underestimate responses, as there are reasons to believe that some bequests
are foreseen and accounted for in the life cycle plan of the recipients.
Even though we believe that our study provides a comprehensive description of
Carnegie effects, the economic implications are still uncertain and mixed. The results
with respect to young recipients denote long lasting harmful Carnegie effects, but we
also see signs that parts of the effects come from using the new funds for business
activities. Carnegie effects are also curbed by adjustment costs in finding new optima
and, notably, we find results which support the theory that recipients may not feel
entitled to use intergenerational transfers only on their own consumption of leisure
when there is a new generation awaiting support. Interestingly, these latter two
findings give support for two rather common features of the inheritance tax, given
that one would like to limit the Carnegie effect: progressive rate schedules and higher
tax rates for recipients that are not direct heirs. Also, given that we have found
stronger effects for recipients of large transfer, it is important to emphasize that
Norwegian wealth likely will increase in the future (Thoresen et al., 2001), which
in turn implies that intergenerational transfers also will rise (despite the Carnegie
effect), having consequences for labor supply in the years to come.
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A Supplementary descriptions of the matching
A.1 Estimation results for the propensity score model
Coefficient SE t-stat
Log wage income .05510113 .08224276 .66998159
Log capital income -.00888375 .01137971 -.78066601
Log financial wealth -.01807157 .00939608 -1.9233098
Log debt .00609102 .00608637 1.0007651
Log housing wealth -.01322149 .01510352 -.87539139
Log vacation housing w. .01177483 .01820479 .64679818
Log business income .01273834 .01834363 .6944285
Male -.02482608 .05344429 -.46452257
Houshold size .52503054 .02124822 24.709391
Male*housh.size -.05367302 .03031698 -1.7703947
Wage equals zero .2897031 .43680827 .66322715
High school .11266626 .01649235 6.8314259
University .19593142 .01936291 10.118904
High school father .13537568 .01563613 8.6578758
High school mother .11954891 .01583155 7.5513091
University father .233977 .02498943 9.3630394
University mother .23582104 .03018711 7.8119782
Age 181 -.58672849 .36421949 -1.6109201
Age 19 -.74720673 .32972281 -2.2661663
Age 20 -.56704801 .24655125 -2.2999195
Age 21 -.60402208 .22755959 -2.6543469
Age 22 -.55262126 .20962337 -2.6362579
Age 23 -.58362866 .19966926 -2.922977
Age 24 -.52859477 .19096385 -2.7680357
Age 25 -.48624477 .18414665 -2.6405301
Age 26 -.46680456 .18051387 -2.5859762
Age 27 -.46314653 .17834238 -2.5969516
Age 28 -.40522517 .17617342 -2.3001493
Age 29 -.40575746 .17531887 -2.314397
Age 30 -.38791638 .1744971 -2.2230535
Age 31 -.32636161 .17359942 -1.8799695
Age 32 -.3376059 .1737845 -1.9426698
Age 33 -.25417358 .17302249 -1.4690205
Age 34 -.19455022 .17279029 -1.1259326
Age 35 -.15781381 .17281528 -.91319357
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A.1 Logit results – Continued from previous page
Coefficient SE t-stat
Age 36 -.09635211 .17257043 -.55833502
Age 37 -.04419431 .1725913 -.25606338
Age 38 -.0029563 .17236361 -.01715156
Age 39 .11625802 .17163579 .67735304
Age 40 .1829724 .17122743 1.0685928
Age 41 .25386369 .17062792 1.4878204
Age 42 .33749926 .17000835 1.9851923
Age 43 .37530184 .16964889 2.2122269
Age 44 .43857542 .16935119 2.5897393
Age 45 .52420268 .16873038 3.1067474
Age 46 .5831221 .16848927 3.4608856
Age 47 .64952993 .16832805 3.8587148
Age 48 .69836224 .16804095 4.155905
Age 49 .75011943 .16782927 4.4695386
Age 50 .78779607 .16761572 4.700013
Age 51 .79646728 .1677149 4.7489357
Age 52 .83749731 .16727983 5.0065647
Age 53 .8185682 .16738004 4.8904767
Age 54 .82404287 .16751877 4.9191076
Age 55 .83154396 .16779747 4.9556406
Age 56 .76546297 .16877616 4.5353737
Age 57 .74730155 .16930971 4.4138139
Age 58 .67075073 .17056262 3.9325776
Age 59 .60298294 .17147898 3.5163664
Age 60 .53074954 .17241846 3.0782639
Age 612 .34579508 .1365072 2.5331637
Log prev wage inc. -.01242517 .01383708 -.89796133
Log prev business inc. -.00505946 .01016572 -.49769757
Log prev capital inc. .04470505 .0118392 3.7760188
One dep. child -.04273629 .01814461 -2.3553163
Two dep .children -.08249114 .02019344 -4.0850464
Three dep .children -.12753485 .02786529 -4.5768361
Four or more dep. children -.20109758 .05514414 -3.6467625
Square log wage inc. -.00249864 .00388104 -.64380713
Square log capital inc. .00029501 .00086745 .34008598
Square log financial w. .00237085 .0006377 3.7178378
Square log debt -.00114011 .00047917 -2.3793285
Square log housing w. .00146388 .00124535 1.1754801
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A.1 Logit results – Continued from previous page
Coefficient SE t-stat
Square log vac. housing w. -.00040612 .00164973 -.24617678
Square log business inc. -.00086454 .00168472 -.51316391
Square log previous wage inc. .00210425 .00091086 2.3101684
Square log previous business inc. .00046364 .00087432 .53028578
Square log previous capital inc. -.00128534 .00077762 -1.6529123
Constant -5.9178531 .48209921 -12.275177
Matches 142,882
Parameters represent the weighted results of logit estimation, weighted by
the numbers of matches each year. Weights: .228, .220, .209, .182, .161.
1The variable Age 18 fully predicts failure in three years. Matches/weights:
55,906/0, 0, .534, .466, 0
2The variable Age 61 fully predicts failure in one year. Matches/weights:
110,370/0, .285, .271, .236, .209
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A.2 t-tests of differences between characteristics of recipients and non-recipients
Inheritors (mean) Non-inheritors (mean) t-stat
Log wage income 11.61 11.61 -.1177
Log capital income 6.634 6.638 .1277
Log financial wealth 9.825 9.825 -.0186
Log debt 8.358 8.320 -.7815
Log housing wealth 6.386 6.354 -.6340
Log vacation housing w. 1.566 1.555 -.3322
Log business income .6702 .6773 .3100
Male .4595 .4587 -.1792
Housh. size 1.773 1.771 -.5801
Male*Housh. size .8162 .8127 -.4384
Wage equals zero .0451 .0452 .0986
High school .4804 .4800 -.1133
University .3156 .3165 .2445
High school father .3080 .3077 -.0877
High school mother .2986 .2991 .1028
University father .1021 .1016 -.2329
University mother .0594 .0581 -.5972
Age 44.85 44.83 -.2052
Log previous wage inc. 13.44 13.44 .0977
Log previous business inc. 1.476 1.469 -.2228
Log previous capital inc. 8.381 8.395 .7134
Number of dep. children .7731 .7657 -.9048
Matches 142,882
The weighted values of observable characteristics for inheritors and non-inheritors,
as well as the t-statistic of a mean equality test, weighted by the numbers of
matches each year. Weights: .228, .220, .209, .182, .161.
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B Supplementary results
B.1 Nearest and three-nearest neighbor matching
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The average difference in log wage between recipients and non−recipients,
and the 95 percent confidence interval.
Maximum number of matches 142,882 (NN) and 142,624 (3−NN).
All inheritances
−14
−12
−10
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
Effect
(percent)
−6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Year
Nearest neighbor Confidence interval,NN
Three nearest neighbor Confidence interval,3−NN
The average difference in log wage between recipients and non−recipients,
and the 95 percent confidence interval.
Maximum number of matches 51,597 (NN) and 51,465 (3−NN).
Large inheritances
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B.2 Nearest neighbor matching and inverse probability weighting
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The average difference in log wage between recipients and non−recipients,
and the 95 percent confidence interval.
Maximum number of matches 142,882 (NN) and 148,114 (IPW).
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The average difference in log wage between recipients and non−recipients,
and the 95 percent confidence interval.
Maximum number of matches 51,597 (NN) and 53,612 (IPW).
Large inheritances
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B.1 Effect of inheritance on intensive margin hours of work
All inheritances Above mean
inheritances1
Est. SE Est. SE
5 years before .1079 .1015 .0606 .1466
4 years before .0359 .0807 .0045 .1179
3 years before2 -.0223 .0672 -.1103 .1022
2 years before -.0223 .0669 -.0532 .1017
1 year before -.0639 .0669 .0530 .1020
Year of receipt -.1127 .0668 -.1394 .1031
1 year after -.1939** .0670 -.2035* .1033
2 years after -.1451* .0659 -.0969 .1019
3 years after -.1134 .0744 -.1041 .1168
4 years after -.1169 .0903 -.0292 .1460
5 years after -.2105 .1260 .1423 .2107
No of matches3 26,185 10,250
1 Inheritances larger than 300,000 NOK ($1=7.55 NOK).
2 Year of matching.
3 Maximum number of matches, i.e. from the year of
matching until one year after receipt.
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01
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